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Economists concerned by the rise in European unemployment have paid
little attention to the increase in the active population. One reason for this
lack of interest is that relations between labor supply and unemployment
cannot persist in the long run in representative agent models, since capital
stock will increase endogenously, as will the productivity of labor. This is
the conventional Solowian view applied to non-clearing labor markets. In
some models, however, the size of the labor force can aﬀect equilibrium
unemployment through a composition eﬀect.1
Precisely, one of the most substantive changes in the OECD labor
markets since the 1960’s is the massive entrance of women and the larger
cohorts of young workers, which arguably, cannot be considered as homo-
geneous variations in the size of population. Section 1 will ﬁrst document
this trend, using French microeconomic data from Enqueˆte Actifs Financiers
1992, where information on true employment experience is available. Young
and female workers have a smaller number of (eﬃcient) units of employ-
ment experience. It is worth noting that important empirical works (Welch
(1979), Bloom, Freeman and Korenman (1987), Murphy, Plant and Welch
(1988) among others, and more recently Shimer (1998)) have similarly con-
cluded to the importance of the adverse impact of the baby-boom cohorts
∗ Based on IIES Seminar Paper Series 98-651, IZA dp 463 with a slight change in the title. It is also based
on two chapters of my PhD dissertation at the London School of Economics. The empirical part on French
data was done at INSEE-CREST, the hospitality of which is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Christophe
Soil for the simulation part.
∗∗ Other affiliations : CIRPEE and ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles. Address : Université du Québec à
Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, Case postale 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville, Montréal
(Québec), CANADA H3C 3P8
1 This is the case in Pissarides (1990), where labor force growth affects equilibrium unemployment by
increasing the share of young workers through more new entrants into the labor force. See also Nickell
(1991), and, on relative wages, the theoretical part in Welch (1979).
461
462 Recherches Économiques de Louvain – Louvain Economic Review 70(4), 2004
in the labor markets.2 It is regrettable to notice that there are few theoreti-
cal works on this question, since labor supply (composition and dynamics)
and other labor market variables (such as unemployment, relative wages or
human capital investment) interact in a complex way.
So, in the second part of the paper, I will attempt to clarify some
of these interactions between labor supply, the level of employment and
unemployment and the accumulation of labor market experience. Section 2
introduces the notations of a model of labor markets with endogenous par-
ticipation, unemployment and human capital. Skills are provided through
employment experience accumulation. Unskilled workers are young workers
or older workers with insuﬃcient experience. Unemployment arises from
wage rigidities at the bottom of the distribution of wages. Section 3 intro-
duces the dynamic of labor supply, deﬁnes the solution and the equilibria
both in the short-run and in the long-run, and ﬁnally investigates the im-
pact of two labor supply variables : the growth rate of population, taken
exogenous, and the distribution of opportunity costs of participating to the
labor market in the second period of workers’ life. The latter is meant at
capturing the trend in the propensity to participate to the labor market of
marginally attached workers discussed in Section 2.
The key result is that a labor market with large enough wage rigidities
is unstable and leads to multiple equilibria. This result is obtained under
constant returns to scale in production. Moreover, one reaches and stays in
the low employment equilibrium after a large supply shock, even if this shock
is a temporary one. This result is due to the intertemporal transmission of
shocks through the skill composition of the labor force. Lower employment
today leads to a lower number of skilled workers the following period since
they are fewer to accumulate experience. This therefore reduces the demand
for inexperienced workers and reduces youth employment. Endogenous
participation plays a stabilizing role; when employment is too low, the
unskilled older workers leave the labor force, freeing the labor market
for younger workers. However, the multiplicity of equilibria remains. In
a competitive labor market instead, wage ﬂexibility breaks the vicious
circle and allows young workers to start with lower wages but accumulate
experience. This arises at the cost of higher wage inequality between
experienced and inexperienced workers.
Note that this is not the ﬁrst paper where this kind of intertemporal
transmission of the shocks of the labour market is implicitly present;
Pissarides (1992) and Ortega (2000) are two examples in a job matching
framework. However, unlike the two previous papers, this model does not
need search frictions, and its emphasis is on labor supply trends as initiators
of the ampliﬁcation of the shocks. It also goes further into the analysis of the
composition of the supply of skills and notably of the role of labor market
experience. To our knowledge, these are the only papers focusing on labor
2 Shimer’s conclusion, notably, is that U.S. unemployment rate variations in time reflect partly the age
composition of the labor force.
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market equilibria with a dynamic transmission of shocks from one period
to another. There are several other papers in the literature where multiple
equilibria arise due to market imperfections, but those papers diﬀer from
this one since there is no such intertemporal transmission of shocks.3
Finally, Section 4 concludes by discussing the limits of the theoretical
results established here, notably the absence of an alternative channel for
skill accumulation such as education4.
1 Labor Supply
In all OECD countries, there has been an increasing number of women in the
labor force and, also to some extent, of the 25-34 year old workers. Various
other measures of the age composition of the labor force indicate similar
trends, with sometimes a tendency towards a re-increase in the average age
of the labor force in the second half of the 80’s5.
To re-express these trends in terms of human capital implications, one
can measure the change in the supply of experience based on macroecono-
mic labor market participation data, in adapting the perpetual inventory
method. The outcome of this methodology (Wasmer 2001) indicates that
most OECD countries indeed faced a decline of experience in the 70’s, early
80’s, and then an increase in experience in the 90’s.
Using alternative data based on French individual data, it is also
possible to decompose the ﬁtted hourly wage (from two wage equations
for each gender) of all individuals in the labor force into two components,
experience (on the x-axis) and education (on the y-axis)6. A quite large
decline in the ’experience’ component in wages during the period 1970-77
can be observed. In a second period, after 1977, the decrease in the average
eﬃciency units of experience of the labor force decelerates, and there is a
strong rise in the supply of education. I obtained very similar results for
the US.
3 In another model of search frictions, duration dependance can also imply multiple equilibria (Coles and
Masters, 2000). As they put it, ’multiplicity is possible through a skill composition effects’. Either firms match
fast with low skill workers or match slowly with good quality workers, the latter having not lost skills. In
the human capital literature, externalities also lead to multiple equilibria. Note here that we obtain multiple
equilibria without relying on human capital externalities.
4 On education, and beyond the previous version of the present work (1997 for the PhD version and 2002
for a recent discussion paper), one can very usefully refer to several recent works. More specifically on the
links between education and labor market imperfections, one can read Charlot (2002) and Decreuse and
Charlot (2003). On the interplay between education and experience in an OLG structure, one can refer to de
la Croix and Docquier (2003). On OLG models with demographic trends and education, see Boucekkine et
al. (2000). On the relation between endogenous participation and education choices, one can read Charlot
(2003).
5 A more detailed description of these trends and the choice of the definition of ’young’ workers can be found
in the discussion paper version of this text.
6 Wasmer (1997)
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Here, I investigate the same issue with another microeconomic dataset
for France, the survey ‘Actifs Financiers 1992’. This is a unique dataset in
which individuals declare their number of years in part-time and full time
employment since the beginning of their working life. A description of the
variables and the instruments is reported in appendix A. The goal here
is to show the diﬀerence between real and potential experience (potential
experience being age minus (imputed) age at the end of education, the usual
proxy in 90% of the studies), and accordingly, to understand to what extent
women can be considered as “young”, i.e. low-experienced.
Table 1 reports real experience, potential experience and their relative
diﬀerence (% Gap) in diﬀerent cells of the active population. The ﬁrst row
represents the average (potential or real) experience of all active men (or
women), rows 2-5 sort individuals according to potential experience and the
last four rows according to the quartile of hourly wage (in this case, the
sample is restricted to the active employed workers). The third and sixth
column give the relative diﬀerence between potential and real experience.
Note that this gap reﬂects either the time spent out of activity, i.e. for older,
less qualiﬁed women, or into unemployment.
It appears quite clearly from the table that in 1992, the average real
experience of women was by 16% lower than their potential experience.
When compared to men, it appears that the high-skill women actually have
obtained experience levels similar to those of men : the relative gap between
the real and the potential experience of women in the fourth quantile is
11%, close to the men’s average (9.6%). Finally, young workers of both
gender have faced diﬃculties to access their ﬁrst job; the gap is 10.6%
for men, and 17% for women. These averages in the diﬀerent cells do not
only reﬂect the participation behavior of workers in 1992, but the entire
participation history of these workers. The diﬀerences between actual and
potential experience are much larger for the oldest women (exp > 30), about
22%, while the corresponding ﬁgure is 3.5% for men.
Beyond gross diﬀerences in experience across groups, the knowledge
of the returns to real experience by gender is also informative. This notably
provides an estimate of the number of eﬃciency units of experience supplied
by diﬀerent groups, by multiplying the return and the quantity of experience
supplied by workers. Using a classical Mincer wage equation (Mincer 1974),
one ﬁnds in Table 2 the following coeﬃcients for experience (controlling for
education with seven dummy variables)7.
Even when considering true experience instead of potential expe-
rience8, it appears that after 20 years of employment experience (the median
number of years of experience), the average return to experience is 3.34% a
7 The variables in the participation equation (Heckman) are (Age - Age of First Paid Activity) and its square,
a dummy variable for being married, the number of children less than three, six and eighteen year old and
a dummy for the participation of individual’s mother. Using these variables to instrument real experience
gives extremly similar results (available on request).
8 It is sometimes considered that potential experience is a good instrument for real experience. There is
obviously a tradeoff between taking care of the correlation between real experience and the residuals, and
Étienne Wasmer 465
Table 1 : France 1992, cell averages, men in the labor force
Men Women
Real Exp. Pot. Exp. %Gap Real Exp. Pot. Exp. %Gap
All 20.7 22.9 0.096 17.8 21.4 0.168
exp  10 5.9 6.6 0.106 5.3 6.4 0.172
11  exp  20 14.0 15.5 0.097 13.4 15.6 0.141
21  exp  30 23.3 25.2 0.075 21.9 25.3 0.134
exp  31 33.2 34.4 0.035 29.7 37.9 0.216
Table 2 : France 1992, variable : Log Hourly Wage. Heteroskedasticity consistent
standard error in parentheses.
Men GLS Wom. GLS Wom. Heckman
Experience 0.049 (0.002) 0.030 (0.004) 0.029 (0.005)
Exp. Sq. (×100) −0.078 (0.005) −0.042 (0.010) −0.038 (0.011)
Inv. of Mill’s ratio − − 0.223 (0.066)
R2 0.356 0.239 0.251
N obs 3641 3 108 2 984
year for men whereas it is 2.16% for women; the gender gap in the return to
experience is about 45%. Interestingly, this 45% ﬁgure is close to Mincer’s
estimates; he reports (1997, p. S31) that he assumes the female investment
ratio in human capital to be half of the corresponding ﬁgure for men. De-
pending on the sample (notably excluding the very low wage workers), the
diﬀerence can sometimes be smaller than 45%, but always remain above
30%.
The natural conclusion is that, at the same level of employment
experience, the ‘eﬃcient units’ of experience supplied by women are 45%
lower and accordingly an increasing relative supply of female workers, added
to the increasing size of the cohorts of new entrants into the labor market,
decrease the per-worker level of experience.
2 A model
Given the evidence presented in the previous section, representative agents’
models cannot address the impact of labor supply trends on labor market
outcomes. This section is devoted to building the simplest dynamic model
treating the systematic bias due to measurement error in experience (especially for women). These specific
issues are investigated in Wasmer (1997).
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which can incorporate the impact of heterogeneity in the supply trends
on equilibrium unemployment. Note that the model presented here diﬀers
from the previous literature on the link between human capital theory
and life-cycle decisions (e.g. Weiss 1986, Mincer 1997 and the subsequent
references) in two ways : unemployment is introduced, and the aggregate
returns to diﬀerent skills are endogenous, since the focus of the paper is a
macroeconomic one.
2.1 Production technology
There are only two broad types of occupations in the economy. The
ﬁrst occupation can be ﬁlled by everyone and the second cannot be
ﬁlled by the unskilled and is thus restricted to the skilled workers. The
production technology combines the skilled and the unskilled labor inputs.
The eﬃciency units of employment of skilled workers are denoted by ESt , and
the eﬃciency units of employment of unskilled workers by EUt . The constant
return to scale production function of the representative ﬁrm will be : F =
F (ESt , E
U
t , τ), where τ is a technology parameter which represents biased
technological progress raising the relative demand for skilled workers.9
Capital is ruled out; at a ﬁxed interest rate, the above production function is
the long-run reduced form of a more general technology with three factors,
that is, capital, skilled and unskilled labor. Accordingly, marginal products
can be expressed as functions gU and gS of the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor denoted by zt = E
S
t /E
U
t :
gU (zt) = FU (E
S
t , E
U
t , τ) (1)
gS(zt) = FS(E
S
t , E
U
t , τ)
with
dgU (zt)/dzt > 0 (2)
dgS(zt)/dzt < 0
2.2 Workers
Cohorts of size Pt of agents enter the labor market at time t. The growth
rate of the cohorts is nt
10. The agents live two periods. In the spirit of Welch
(1979), workers move from the low to the high occupation between the ﬁrst
and second period of life, provided that they can accumulate enough human
capital. There are a priori two ways of accumulating human capital. The
9 This is a commonly invoked explanation for the rise in inequality in the US, e.g. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
(1993) and Katz and Murphy (1992).
10 Given that agents live two periods and that yearly population growth is around 1%, one can think of nt as
being the growth rate of population over 25 years, i.e. around 0.28.
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ﬁrst is to spend the ﬁrst period of one’s life in education and work the second
period. The second is to obtain employment experience in ﬁrst period.
Further, experience accumulation can be made endogenous by introducing
on-the job training decisions.
To expose the paper in the simplest possible way, some of the channels
described above are ignored and notably all individual human capital
margins are shut down. This concerns education : all workers start with the
same level of schooling. This also concerns on-the job training. Note however
that this does not imply that experience accumulation is exogenous. It is
endogenous and will notably depend on the aggregate state of the labor
market. This is suﬃcient to highlight the main mechanism of the paper at a
low analytical cost. The reader interested in those individual human capital
decisions and in the interaction between experience and education can refer
to the earlier versions of this work in which these issues were fully addressed
or in the literature listed in footnote 4. They are brieﬂy summarized in the
concluding comments of Section 4.
As a result of modelling choices, workers in the second period of
their life can be in three diﬀerent situations. They can be 1. experienced; 2.
inexperienced and uneducated; ﬁnally, they can be 3. out of the labor force.
The skilled workers belong to category 1, the unskilled to category 2. I will
denote the experienced workers by Ex, the old unskilled (inexperienced and
uneducated) by O, and the young workers by Y .
To keep the model simple, the young workers (EYt ) and the old
unskilled workers (EOt ) are perfect substitutes in the production, E
U
t =
EYt +E
O
t . This means that, whatever the reason for not having accumulated
experience (unemployment, inactivity or simply being in one’s ﬁrst period),
workers are neither discriminated nor have suﬀered any human capital
loss. This is an important diﬀerence to previous works assuming that
unemployment duration has a speciﬁc adverse impact on workers, as in
Pissarides (1992).
Since the focus of this paper is a macroeconomic one, I present here
only a quite ‘crude’ description of experience accumulation, compared to the
literature summarized by Weiss (1986). I assume that only a fraction et =
1− ut of a cohort of young workers can get enough employment experience
to be considered as skilled next period, where ut is the unemployment rate
for young workers.11 The convenient notation et = 1 − ut represents the
employment to labor force ratio of the unskilled workers. Note also that
11 Linearity in et is chosen so that the exposition of the argument is simplified, but a more general specification
would lead to the same results. Assume, for instance, that each period is subdivided into p smaller subperiods
where a lottery is held each time to randomly distribute jobs across workers. The experience level to access
the skilled jobs could be q successive spells of employment, with q < p. Then, the fraction of workers who
access skilled jobs is a function Φ(ut, p, q), with Φ1 > 0, Φ2 > 0 and Φ3 < 0. What simply matters to
obtain the main result of the paper is that the aggregate outcome at a (big) period t depends strongly on past
outcomes. This only requires agents who live two periods. More realism could be introduced by modelling
more than two periods, at the cost of additional complexity and without qualitative changes. An alternative
route, explored in Wasmer (2002) section 4.2, is to model on-the-job investments and their determinants.
Multiple equilibria still come out from this more general specification.
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given the perfect substitutability in production and the assumption of an
absence of discrimination towards older unskilled workers, the quantities ut
and et refer to both young workers and old unskilled workers, even though
later on, by an abuse of language, et will be called the employment rate.
2.3 Unemployment
The wage of the unskilled may not always be market-clearing, due to some
downwards rigidities. Unemployment only aﬀects the unskilled; the wages
of the skilled are market-clearing. The wage rigidity can be linked to the
existence of a wage setting curve, linking wages and unemployment as in
eﬃciency wages model, to the existence of Nash-Bargaining linked to search
frictions, the existence of unions setting wages given the labor demand curve
of the ﬁrms, or risk-averse workers buying an insurance to risk-neutral ﬁrms.
A frequent short-cut to get a non-market-clearing wage for the unskilled is
to assume that it decreases with unemployment, like in the wage curve
models. Here, we follow an early literature (Layard et al. 1991) and think
of wages in the unskilled labor market as being represented by a double log
functional form, of the type
ln(wUt ) = b− φ · ln(1− et) (3)
The results of the model remain the same if one instead chooses a log
linear formulation for the wage curve. Given that skilled workers can apply
to unskilled jobs, we have to check ex-post that wUt < w
S
t . In the proof of
Proposition 2, we oﬀer a simple condition on the parameter reﬂecting the
relative demand for skilled workers.
Among the alternative ways of introducing wage rigidity, one can cite
Saint-Paul (1995) : he assumes the existence of a minimum wage indexed
on the average wage (as the French minimum wage, for instance). This
mechanism has been investigated : in this model with two types of workers,
this is equivalent to having a maximum dispersion of wages, i.e. a constant
indexation rate γ < 1 and the condition on wages writes wU  γ · wS .
This yields to simpler results yet less rich features, as one of the long-run
equilibria deﬁned later on explicitly depends on the limit of unskilled wages
when et approaches one
12. We will thus use equation (3) except when we
introduce the competitive labor market as a benchmark (next Section), in
which case wages will be fully downward ﬂexible regardless of the level of
unskilled employment.
12 An alternative specification would be to model a formal game of wage bargaining, at some additional
complexity cost and without many more insights on the dynamics of skill accumulation.
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2.4 Endogenous participation
Participation is modelled as a static extension of the neoclassical model
of labor supply. The value of non-market time of workers is assumed to
be age-dependent. In the ﬁrst period of time, this value is denoted by Λ1
which has the interpretation of a reservation wage. In the second period,
it is denoted by Λ2. We assume that Λ2 > Λ1, as older workers ﬁnd eﬀort
more costly. Furthermore, Λ1 is assumed to be close enough to zero so that
conveniently, in the ﬁrst period of life, young workers will all participate
to the labor market. This is an empirical fact : the participation rates of
workers not enrolled in education are higher at lower ages and then decline
with time13.
This reservation wage is a pecuniary equivalent of utility when the
worker is not in the labor force. In the second period, workers will participate
if the expected wage is higher than the reservation wage. The participation
rate of the unskilled in the second period is thus simply, either one or less
than one. In the latter case, et decreases so that the expected wage is equal
to the reservation wage. Formally,
ρOt = 1 if etw
O
t > Λ2 or,
etw
O
t = Λ2 and 0 < ρ
O
t < 1 .
Similarly, the participation rate of skilled workers is ρExp = 1 if wSt > Λ2
and between 0 and 1 if wSt = Λ2. Given that we only consider situations
for which wUt < w
S
t , w
S
t = Λ2 would imply w
U
t < Λ2 i.e. that old unskilled
workers all retire from the labor force (ρO = 0), a degenerated situation we
prefer not to consider here. This implies that from now on, ρExp = 1.
We have thus here two variables describing the composition of labor
supply and the trend to more inexperienced workers : nt and Λ2. An increase
in nt is associated with a younger labor force. The second channel is more
subtle. In a male-dominated labor force, one expects Λ2 to be very low. As
women with recurrent interruptions of labor market activity enter the labor
market, the average Λ2 in the economy should raise.
3 The setup
3.1 Dynamics of labor supply and employment
The labor supply of skilled workers is simply the number of the old
experienced workers, LSt = L
Ex
t . The unskilled workers are both the young
13 In Wasmer (1998), I introduced at the beginning of the second period a shock on leisure (birth, disease),
leading to a distribution of reservation wages wr in the population, with a cumulative density function. In
order to simplify the exposition, I take here the degenerate distribution. The proofs are much simplified and
the main results are preserved.
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workers and the old inexperienced ones. Unskilled labor supply is therefore
the sum the two categories : LUt = L
Y
t + L
O
t .
Given the existence of unemployment among the unskilled, the time
structure of the model provides the following dynamic labor supply equa-
tions :
LExt = Pt−1 · et−1 (4)
LOt = Pt−1 · (1− et−1) · ρOt (5)
LYt = Pt, (6)
Eq. (4) indicates that the experienced workers who participate are the young
employed participants of the previous period, i.e. LYt−1 multiplied by their
probability of having been employed et−1. A similar interpretation holds for
(5), reminding that ρOt is the participation rate of old, unskilled workers.
Eq. (6) states that the entire cohort of young workers participate and thus
labor supply equals the size of the cohort.
In terms of employment, full employment of skilled workers and the
deﬁnition of the employment rate of the unskilled workers imply that
ESt = L
Ex
t
EUt = etL
U
t
or in terms of ratio of skilled to unskilled employment zt :
zt =
Pt−1et−1
et
[
Pt + Pt−1 · (1− et−1) · ρOt
] = et−1/et
1 + nt + (1− et−1)ρOt
(7)
3.2 Solution
The equilibrium at time t involves the knowledge of (zt, et, ρ
O
t , w
U
t , w
S
t ).
Once zt is determined as a function of et and ρ
O
t for a given et−1, equations
(1) provide the marginal product of all groups of workers. Conditional on
the wage determination rule, either competitive determination or a wage
curve (3), this provides the level of employment et of the unskilled through
the standard equalization of the marginal product
wUt = g
U (zt) (8)
while the participation rate of the older unskilled workers is determined
though equation (4). In other words, et and ρ
O
t are functions of zt for all t.
Equation (7) thus implies a dynamic link between zt and zt−1 or equivalently
between et and et−1 which can be thought as a short-run equilibrium. Given
decreasing returns to scale, relative labor demand curves are downward
sloping with respect to employment. If the wage is competitively determined,
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labor supply of the unskilled is upward sloping with a kink in Λ2. If the wage
follows equation (3), instead it is upward sloping in unskilled employment.
So, the link between et and et−1 is unique in each of the two possible
participation regimes deﬁned formally now.
Deﬁnition Regime FP is deﬁned as the Full Participation regime, i.e. the
participation rate of the old unskilled workers ρOt equals 1. Regime 2 has
instead ρOt < 1 and is called the Partial Participation regime (PP).
We can also deﬁne a long-run equilibrium as a situation in which, if
nt is constant to a steady-value, et = et−1 or zt = zt−1 and thus wages
and participation levels are constant. As we now show, multiple long-run
equilibria may arise.
3.3 Competitive wages
While wage rigidity are a more accurate representation of a European labor
market, it is better to start with a market-clearing labor market, as a
benchmark. In this case, wages of the unskilled are able to decline enough
for full employment to hold in all cases, implying et ≡ 1. Accordingly,
zt = 1/(1+nt) and all older workers have accumulated experience in the ﬁrst
period of life. Accordingly, they are all skilled workers. Since we assumed
that ρExp = 1, only the full-participation regime holds here.
Proposition 1 When wages are competitive, there is a unique long-run
equilibrium. A higher n increases inequality.
Proof Wages are equal to the marginal productivity of labor at full-employment
— this for every t. The wage of the unskilled is determined by wUt = g
U (zt) =
gU
(
1
1+nt
)
. The wage of the skilled workers is given by wSt = g
S(zt) = g
S
(
1
1+nt
)
.
In the long-run, i.e. when nt = n, a higher n thus raises the relative wage of skilled
to the unskilled wS/wU , given inequalities (2).
The intuition is that a increase in n is an increase in the supply of
young workers. This reduces their absolute and relative wage since the
wage of the skilled (experienced) workers is increased. Since there is full
employment, the employment to labor force ratio is identically equal to
one. A fact supporting Proposition 1 is the increase in the wage return to
experience in the US over time, as reported in Juhn et al. (1993)14, for
instance. Since 1963, the return to experience has increased a lot, to a much
larger extent than the return to education. As indicated in Section 1, there
has also been a decline in the supply of ’experience’. It is tempting to see
a causality at this stage : a lower supply of skills (experience) increases the
return to experience.
14 See also Acemoglu (2002) and Gottschalk (1997) for more recent evidence on wage inequality.
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What about dynamic issues ? In the short-run, the skill composition of
the labor force zt depends on nt, but not on zt−1 and thus does not exhibit
a particularly rich dynamic pattern. Accordingly, this ﬂexible economy,
with full employment and uniqueness of a long-run equilibrium, faces no
persistence of temporary supply shocks.
3.4 A non-market-clearing labor market
Things are very diﬀerent in a world in which wages exhibit some wage
rigidity. Equation (3) implies that wUt goes to inﬁnity when et goes to 1,
implying that there will always exist some positive level of unemployment
at any time t. The dynamics of this economy can be summarized by the
dynamics of this variable et, by Proposition 2 :
Figure 1 : Dynamic of the economy : the employment rate et of the unskilled as
a function of past period employment et−1 and 45 degree line.
Proposition 2 The dynamic of the economy is described by a function
et(et−1). This function has a ﬂat part corresponding to regime PP i.e. when
the participation rate of unskilled workers is below 1. The limit of et when
et−1 goes to 1 is strictly below 1. In between, the slope of et(et−1) is always
strictly positive, can be very large and thus may intersect the 45◦ line more
than once. In the generic case, we have multiple long-run equilibria. See the
dynamics of employment in Figure 1. If the curve intersects the 45◦ line
once only, there would only be one long-run equilibrium.
Proof The proof is in four steps and two lemmas.
a) Link between et and et−1. We have as a ﬁrst order condition that
wUt = g
U (zt)
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where zt is the current ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. Using the double
log-wage equation (3), we thus obtain
exp(b)(1− et)−φ = gU
(
et−1/et
1 + nt + (1− et−1)ρOt
)
(9)
b) Hierarchy in wages : wUt < w
S
t when et tends to 1. See Appendix B.
c) Existence of a regime PP, i.e. ρOt < 1.
d) Properties of the full-participation regime FP, i.e. ρOt = 1. In the full-
participation regime, we have
b− φ ln(1− et) = ln gU {et−1/ [et(2 + nt − et−1)]} (10)
Figure 2 : Short-run equilibrum for et : Labor demand for the unskilled as a
function of the stock of experience (depending of et−1) and the
wage curve.
The left-and side is a wage setting curve, increasing in et. The right-
hand side is the labor demand function, representing the demand for unskilled
workers. It is decreasing in et by concavity of F (i.e. FUU < 0). This
labor demand curve is also shifted up by higher et−1 and by lower nt, and
ﬁnally, by lower τ (the parameter reﬂecting the relative demand for skilled
workers). A higher et−1 simply means more skilled workers at time t, and thus,
given complementarity between skilled and unskilled, higher relative demand
for unskilled workers. A higher nt simply means more competition among the
unskilled, and thus lower employment. See Figure 2 for an illustration. Coming
back to equation (10), one sees (formally in Lemma 2 in Appendix B) that
it implies a dynamic link between et and et−1 which is increasing as soon as
FUS > 0 which was assumed in Section 2.1. Further, the limit et = 1 is never
reached : et(et−1 = 1) < 1. The interpretation is simply that wage pressures
are so large at full employment that this can never be a stable equilibrium.
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e) Local convexity of et(et−1). To verify the convexity, we need to compute the
second order derivative d
2et
de2t−1
which implies third order derivatives in the
production function. We thus have no interesting results in the general case and
the function can take all concavities. We can look at a more speciﬁc (Cobb-
Douglas) case. Then we have the following dynamic link between et and et−1.
α ln et − φ ln(1− et) + b = ln(1− α) + α [ln et−1 − ln(2 + nt − et−1)] (11)
One is referred to appendix B for the second order derivatives calculations.
One can simply note that a simulation of (11) with Λ2 = 0, α = 0.5, φ = 0.1
and b = −0.96 leads to three intersections with the 45◦ line, and so to three
equilibria (e = 0, e = 0.57 and e = 0.86). With a positive value for Λ2, the
three intersection occur at e = 0.5, e = 0.57 and e = 0.86.
The model oﬀers the possibility of multiple equilibria, and more spe-
ciﬁcally, the possibility of both a low-employment equilibrium and a high-
employment equilibrium. As indicated in point e) above and in Appendix
B, conditions on parameters for the existence of multiple equilibria involve
third-order derivatives of F and are not provided, as they are not particu-
larly interesting. The possibility of multiple equilibria (e.g. the claim of the
proposition) is demonstrated thanks to the numerical resolution in e).
The intuition for the multiplicity of equilibria is simple : there is an
intertemporal ampliﬁcation of shocks, through the skill composition of the
labor force. If there is low employment in a given point in time, the next
period level of skilled workers will be low since fewer workers accumulate
experience. So, the demand for unskilled remains weak, employment is low
and participation to the labor market is low too. The high employment
equilibrium has just the opposite properties : high level of skilled workers,
so high demand for unskilled, and so on...
3.5 Stability
When there are multiple equilibria, the stability of the equilibrium is
determined by the slope of et(et−1) at the intersection with the 45 degree
line.
Corollary 1 The lowest employment and the highest employment equilibria,
when they exist, are both stable.
Proof The slope of et(et−1) is always positive. The equilibrium is thus stable if
and only if the slope is smaller than 1. The low employment equilibrium (to the left
of Figure 1) is stable due to the existence of a ﬂat part in et(et−1) itself due to the
downwards adjustment of labor market participation when unskilled employment
is too low. The stability of the high employment equilibrium is insured by the
wage pressure of unskilled workers : suppose that the slope of et(et−1) is larger
than 1 around the highest employment equilibrium. A temporary increase in et
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around that equilibrium value would be ampliﬁed, and et would converge to 1,
which is impossible given Lemma 2 in the proof of Proposition 2.
One can derive another corollary to Proposition 2 :
Corollary 2 A temporary shock on nt, if suﬃciently large, can lead to
a permanent change of equilibrium. Static adverse eﬀects like a lower
equilibrium employment or lower participation are driven by larger cohorts
nt, a higher demand for skills raising g
S relative to gU at a given zt and,
higher unskilled wage pressures b. Dynamic adverse eﬀects (the existence
of a low employment equilibrium and the convergence to it) are driven by
the irreversibility of skill loss due to unemployment, and are reinforced by a
higher nt, higher demand for skills and higher b.
Proof All the eﬀects above shift the relative demand for skilled workers and thus
imply a temporary decrease in the curve et(et−1). See Figure 3 for an illustration
with higher nt. Starting from A, if the curves moves downwards, et evolves
temporarily below the 45 degree line. If et becomes lower than a cutoﬀ value
(deﬁned by the unstable, intermediate intersection between the original curve and
the 45 degree line), then et irreversibly converges to B.
Figure 3 : Dynamics of transition from one long-run equilibrium to another with
a temporary or a permament supply shock.
The permanent eﬀect of a temporary shock deserves some further
comments. In ﬁgure 3, a temporary downward shift of the curve et(et−1)
may lead to a permanent change of equilibrium, if the temporary level
of employment et is on the left side of the unstable equilibrium (the
one in the middle of the graph). In this case, the level of employment
converges to the low equilibrium. The economic intuition is the same as
the intuition for the multiplicity of equilibria : the temporary supply shock
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increases unemployment among young/low-experience workers. On average,
the young cohorts accumulate less experience, the supply of skills the next
period is lower, which reduces the demand for unskilled workers. When the
temporary shocks disappear, the labor force still exhibits some trace of the
shock, which is simply that the labor force as on average a low level of
experience. If the initial shock was too big, the economy cannot recover
the previous high equilibrium employment and instead shifts to the low
employment equilibrium.
This persistence and ampliﬁcation of the shocks may characterize well
the situation of Spanish or Italian southern regions in the 80’s, or Irish
peripheral regions before the spectacular growth performance of the 90’s. A
combination of high demographic growth, rigid wage scales and very large
unemployment rates (40% to 50% are not unusual among young workers)
self-reinforced their eﬀects by dynamically reducing the quality of the labor
force, due to the absence of learning on-the-job, or more generally, of works
habits.
4 Concluding comments
It has been argued here that not all the consequences of the coincidence
of rising female participation and the baby-boom have been explored.
This work can be seen as a ﬁrst step in this direction. The section
above has illustrated the key diﬀerence between an economy with rigid
wages and an economy with ﬂexible wages : in the former, a big supply
shock generates crowding out in the market for inexperienced workers, and
thus prevents young workers from accumulating experience, reduces the
employment opportunities of older workers and reduces their participation
rates. The economy cannot recover from the big temporary supply shock
and remains stuck to the low employment/low participation equilibrium.
Southern European experiences may ﬁt this description quite well. Although
we have not explored this possibility here, massive withdrawal from the
labor market by youngsters may lead to the same adverse consequences as
in a rigid labor market. By contrast, the ﬂexible economy accepts some
wage inequality between experienced and inexperienced, but oﬀer them
experience which is thus dynamically more eﬃcient.
Among these results, there are two which deserve further comments
since they can be tested. First, in partial equilibrium, participation and
unemployment rates are negatively linked, since participation decisions are
endogenous and negatively depend on unemployment. The full equilibrium
result is more diﬃcult to derive here. This actually implies that the test of
the link between unemployment and labor supply should deal with a classical
simultaneous equation problem, a diﬃculty acknowledged in Wasmer (1997,
ch. 2). Second, in the stable upper steady-state equilibrium, the growth rate
of the cohorts is positively correlated with unemployment.
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Another extension would be to investigate what happens if two com-
ponents of human capital investments (schooling and on-the-job training)
are added up to the framework. Such questions were directly addressed in a
previous version of the paper (Wasmer 2002). The main conclusion of that
section was that on-the-job training decisions still bring multiple equilibria,
while education choices can partly undo the result and restore unique equi-
libria when education is a complementary input to unskilled labour. Indeed,
when the market for unskilled labour is suﬃciently crowded and slack, pri-
vate returns to education becomes very high, which raises the supply of
skills in the economy and by complementarity, the demand for unskilled.
On-the-job training cannot play the same role as education since, in a slack
labour market, only a fraction of the population, those employed, can ac-
cess to skills : a low employment - low training equilibrium thus still exists.
These extensions generate additional predictions : ﬁrst, higher education of
the workforce is indirectly caused by labor supply trends. And second, hi-
gher investment in human capital from ‘low-experience groups’ like women
in response to adverse supply shocks reduces gender diﬀerences, but the
faster, the lower unemployment. As unemployment is high, convergence in
experience is much slower.
What about the relevance of the study of labor supply trends ? First,
note that among countries with fairly similar wage-setting institutions
(e.g. continental Europe), low unemployment countries are those with a
weak demography in the 70’s and the early 80’s (Scandinavian countries,
Germany) as opposed to France or Spain, and the growth of female
participation should be positively associated with unemployment. Similarly,
many authors have acknowledged than the peak in the sizes of the cohorts in
the 70’s has had consequences for the US wage distribution (see, for instance,
Welch (1979), Murphy, Plant and Welch (1988)) and for the unemployment
rates (Bloom, Freeman and Korenman (1987)). The theoretical model of the
previous sections was precisely based on these contributions, and has been
extended in two directions : female participation as an explicit component
of the supply trend; and the exploration of the links between the supply of
education and the supply of experience.
478 Recherches Économiques de Louvain – Louvain Economic Review 70(4), 2004
Appendix
A Survey ’Actifs Financiers 1992’
In the survey Actifs Financiers 1992, individuals are asked about their past, nota-
bly the age at end of schooling, the age of the ﬁrst paid job, the number of periods
of employment interruptions, the reason for these interruptions (unemployment,
inactivity or disease), and ﬁnally, real employment experience as measured by
the number of years in employment (deﬁned as paid activity excluding “Petits
bouloˆts”) and the number of years in full-time employment. This is quite unique
in micro-surveys, since employment experience is usually approximated by the
potential experience or Mincer’s proxy (age - education - 5 or 6). Education is
deﬁned by the highest diploma obtained in general or vocational classes, and if
there is no diploma, the level reached. It is deﬁned by eight dummy variables (No
Diploma, CEP, CAP or BEP, BEPC, Bac Technique, Bac General, Deug-Licence,
Maıˆtrise and higher) which correspond to : 5 years of schooling, 8 years vocatio-
nal, 8 years general, 12 years vocational, 12 years general, 14 years and more than
15 years. This gives a balanced partition of the sample. Annual wage earnings
for 1990 include premia and wages from temporary employment and secondary
activities. Individuals declare the corresponding number of months, as well as the
percentage with respect to full-time employment. There is no problem of top-
coding here. One is referred to Wasmer 1998 for the name of all these variables in
the survey. The sample is restricted to 15-65 year old workers who are not retired.
About 10% of the sample whose current or last activity is self-employment, are
excluded, since the return to experience in this type of activity may diﬀer from
the return to paid activity.
B Proofs
B.1 Proposition 2, point b)
Since the wage of the unskilled goes to inﬁnity when et tends to 1, we have to
check that the wage of the skilled workers does not become lower than the wage
of the unskilled (otherwise, some skilled workers would apply to unskilled jobs).
This is easy, the intuition is that, as wages increase due to wage pressure, along
these relative demand curves, the demand for both labor is reduced, so that the
hierarchy on wages remain the same. Formally, we can prove that wUt /w
S
t remains
bounded and lower than 1 when et tends to 1. Indeed, if et tends to 1, unskilled
wages are large and this implies ﬁrst full participation to the labor market, i.e.
ρOt = 1. The ratio of ﬁrst order-conditions states that
wUt
wSt
=
gU (zt)
gS(zt)
= r (zt)
where r is an increasing function of zt which becomes in FP regime
et−1/et
1+nt+(1−et−1) .
Thus, zt converges to et−1/(2 + nt − et−1) and is thus smaller than 1/(1 + nt),
and so wUt /w
S
t < r (1/(1 + nt)). For any given nt > −1, there is a production
technology such that the relative demand for unskilled labor is suﬃciently low.
A suﬃcient condition is thus r (1/(1 + nt)) < 1, where r is the ratio of marginal
products, QED.
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To illustrate this point, consider for instance a Cobb-Douglas production function,
ln F = α ln ESt + (1− α) ln EUt 15, and we have
wUt
wSt
=
1− α
α
et−1
et(2 + nt − et−1) <
1− α
α
1
(1 + nt)et
for all et−1 < 1
When et is suﬃciently close to 1, say larger than 1−ε for an arbitrarily small ε > 0,
then
wUt
wSt
< 1 if α > 1
1+ 1
(1+nt)(1−ε)
. As ε goes to 1, and if nt = (1 + 0.01)
25 = 0.28,
the wage of the skilled remains above the unskilled if α > 0.56.
B.2 Proposition 2, point c)
Lemma 1 There exists a range of values of et−1 between 0 and a value denoted by
esupt−1 for which et is a constant of both time and of et−1. Let us denoted it by e¯. If
parameters are such that e¯ < esupt−1 then, at constant growth rate n, there exists a
stable equilibrium given by the intersection of the straight line et = e¯ and of the 45
degree line. One can also determine the participation rates such that, at constant
growth rate n, et = et−1 = f(technology, n, φ, Λ2).
Proof Indeed, in the partial participation regime, we have from equation (3)
that etw
U
t = Λ2. Using (3), this implies Λ2 = ete
b−φ ln(1−et) and thus et is a
constant denoted by e¯, uniquely determined by ln e¯ + ln b − φ ln(1 − e¯) = lnΛ2
as the left-hand side is increasing from −∞ to +∞. Using equation (9), we
obtain Λ2 = g
U
(
et−1/e¯
1+nt+(1−et−1)ρOt
)
. The right-hand side is increasing in et−1
and decreasing in ρOt . Thus, the participation rate ρ
O
t is increasing in et−1. The
limit esupt−1 at which all unskilled workers participate is determined by ρ
O
t = 1,
thus deﬁned by Λ2 = g
U
(
e
sup
t−1/e¯
2+nt−esupt−1
)
. Thus, esupt−1 can be larger or smaller than
e¯. If e¯ < esupt−1, then the ﬂat part in et(et−1) = e crosses the 45 degree line and
thus there exists a stationary participation rate ρ < 1 for the old unskilled, such
that there is a stable employment rate et−1(ρ) = e¯. This participation rate is
determined by Λ2 = g
U
(
1
1+nt+(1−e¯)ρ
)
.
B.3 Proposition 2, point d)
Lemma 2 In the full-participation regime, we have a dynamic link between et and
et−1 which is positive. The limit et = 1 is never reached : et(et−1 = 1) < 1.
Proof Diﬀerentiating with respect to et and et−1, we obtain detdet−1 =
FSU−etFSU[
FU φ
1−et −FUU (2+nt−et−1)
] . Given that skilled and unskilled are assumed to be com-
plement, FSU > 0, and that there are decreasing returns to scale FUU < 0, we have
in all cases that et is increasing in et−1. When −1 approaches one, the right-hand
side of (10) is equal to ln F2(1, et(1+nt)). To the extent that the production func-
tion has no inﬁnite slope for ﬁnite values of the arguments, that value is bounded.
Since the left-hand side of (10) goes to inﬁnity in 1, this implies that there exists
a ﬁnite, smaller than 1 limit for et when et−1 goes to 1.
15 In that case the technology parameter τ defined in Section 2.1 is simply α.
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B.4 Proposition 2, point c) : concavity of et(et−1) with a Cobb-Douglas
production function
Diﬀerentiating equation (11), using the more convenient notation y = et and
x = et−1, one ﬁnds dydx =
1
x
+ 1
2+nt−x
φ/α
1−y +
1
y
> 0 and
sgn
(
d2y
dx2
)
= sgn
[ − 1/x2 + 1/(2 + n− x)2
1/x + 1/(2 + n− x) +
− φ/a(1− y(x))−2 + 1/y2(x)
φ/α(1− y(x))−1 + 1/y(x)
]
When x is close to zero, the negative terms dominate, but, given endogenous
participation, we know that x > esupt−1 deﬁned in Lemma 1. Overall, and depending
on the values of the parameters and notably of technology, we may have the
diﬀerent cases discussed in the Proposition, some of them represented in Figure 1.
Étienne Wasmer 481
References
Acemoglu D. (2002), “Technical Change, Inequality, and The Labor Market”,
Journal of Economic Literature, volume 40, pp. 7-72.
Bloom D., R. Freeman and S. Korenman (1987), “The labor market consequences
of generational crowding”, European Journal of Population, 3, pp. 131-76.
Boucekkine R., D. de la Croix and O. Licandro (2000), “Vintage Human Capital,
Demographic Trends and Endogenous Growth”, Institut de Recherches
Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper 2000-007.
Charlot O. (2002), « E´ducation et Choˆmage dans les mode`les d’appariement »,
the`se de doctorat, Univ. Paris I and Eurequa.
Charlot O. (2003), « E´ducation, emploi et participation au marche´ du travail
dans un mode`le d’appariement », forthcoming Recherches E´conomiques de
Louvain.
Charlot O. and B. Decreuse (2004), “Self-selection in education and matching
frictions”, forthcoming in Labour Economics.
Coles M. and A. Masters (2000), ‘Duration Dependent UI Payments in a Model
of Equilibrium‘”, ESSEX discussion paper.
de la Croix D. and F. Docquier (2003), “Diverging Patterns of Education Premium
and School Attendance in France and the US : A Walrasian View”, IZA
Discussion Paper 846.
Davis S.J. (1992), “Cross-Country Patterns of Change in Relative Wage”, NBER
Macroannuals, pp. 239-292.
Gottschalk P. (1997), “Inequality, Income Growth, and Mobility : The Basic
Facts”, Journal of Economic Perpsectives, 11, pp. 21-40.
Juhn C., K. Murphy and B. Pierce (1993), “Wage Inequality and the Rise in
Return to Skill”, Journal of Political Economy, pp. 410-42.
Katz L. and K. Murphy (1992), “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987 : Supply
and Demand Factors”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, February.
Mincer J. (1974), Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, National Bureau of
Economic Research, New York.
Mincer J. (1997), “The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of
Earnings : Variations on a Theme”, Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1), Part
2 January, pp. S26-47.
Murphy K.M, M. Plant and F.R. Welch (1988), “Cohort Size and Earnings in the
USA”, in Lee R.D., Arthur W.B. and Rodgers Gerry eds., Economics of
changing age distributions in developed countries. International Studies in
Demography series, Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, pp. 39-58.
Ortega J. (2000), “Loss of Skill During Unemployment and Complementarities in
the Production”, the Economic Journal, vol. 110, n. 460, January, pp. 92-
112.
Pissarides C.A. (1990), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Oxford : Basil Black-
well, reedition MIT Press 2000.
Pissarides C.A. (1992), “Loss of Skill During Unemployment and the Persistence
of Employment Shocks”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1371-1391,
November.
Saint-Paul G. (1993), “On the Political Economy of Labor Market Flexibility”,
NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
482 Recherches Économiques de Louvain – Louvain Economic Review 70(4), 2004
Saint-Paul G. (1995), “Labor Market Institutions and the Cohesion of the Middle
class”, discussion paper 1298, CEPR.
Shimer R. (1998), “Why is the U.S. unemployment rate so much lower ?”, NBER
Macroannuals, pp. 11-72.
Wasmer E. (1997), “Changes in the Composition of the labor Force. Implications
for Wages and Unemployment”, PhD dissertation, Department of Econo-
mics, LSE.
Wasmer E. (1998), “Labor Supply Dynamics, Unemployment and Human Capital
Investments”, IIES Seminar Paper Series 98-651.
Wasmer E. (2001), “Measuring human capital in the labor market : the supply of
experience in 8 OECD countries”, European Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings, Vol 45, n◦4-6, pp. 861-874.
Wasmer E. (2002), “Labor Supply Dynamics, Unemployment and Human capital
Investments”, IZA, dp. 463.
Weiss Y. (1986), “The Determination of Life-Cycle Earnings : A survey”, Ch. 11
in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 1, O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, eds.
Welch F. (1979), “Eﬀects of Cohort Size on Earnings : The Baby Boom Babies’
Financial Bust”, Journal of Political Economy, pp. S65-97.
